A key step in Regev's (2009) reduction of the Discrete Gaussian Sampling (DGS) problem to that of solving the Learning With Errors (LWE) problem is a statistical test required for verifying possible solutions to the LWE problem. In this work, we work out a concrete lower bound on the success probability and its effect in determining an upper bound on the tightness gap of the reduction. The success probability is determined by the value of the rejection threshold t of the statistical test. Using a particular value of t, Regev showed that asymptotically, the success probability of the test is exponentially close to one for all values of the LWE error α ∈ (0, 1). From the concrete analysis point of view, the value of the rejection threshold used by Regev is sub-optimal. It leads to considering the lattice dimension to be as high as 400000 to obtain somewhat meaningful tightness gap. We show that by using a different value of the rejection threshold and considering α to be at most 1/ √ n results in the success probability going to 1 for small values of the lattice dimension. Consequently, our work shows that it may be required to modify values of parameters used in an asymptotic analysis to obtain much improved and meaningful concrete security.
Introduction
In a seminal work, Regev [13] introduced the learning with errors (LWE) problem and highlighted its role in lattice-based cryptography. The major achievement of the work was to show a reduction from a worst case lattice problem to the breaking of a cryptosystem. This worst-case to average-case reduction has been later claimed to be a major theoretical advantage of cryptosystems based on lattices. The entire analysis in [13] was done in an asymptotic setting where the lattice dimension n is allowed to go to infinity.
Suppose A is an algorithm which given access to an oracle O solves a problem P in time T with success probability P S . Further, suppose O takes time T and has success probability P S . Then the tightness gap of the algorithm A is (T · P S )/(T · P S ). The reduction is said to be tight if the tightness gap is 1 (or small) and is said to be loose if the tightness gap is 'large'.
A later work [8] performed a concrete analysis of the reduction in [13] to determine whether it can be used to choose parameters for practical cryptosystems. This required determining the tightness gap of the reduction in concrete terms as a function of n. It turned out that the tightness gap can indeed be very large casting doubt on the practical usefulness of the reduction in [13] . For example, for n = 1024, it was argued that the tightness gap is about 2 504 and so the worst-case to average-case reduction in [13] cannot be used to argue about the security of cryptosystems with lattice dimension n = 1024.
The reduction in [13] is a cascade of three smaller reductions. The first reduction is from the Smallest Independent Vector Problem (SIVP) to the problem of Discrete Gaussing Sampling (DGS). The second reduction is from DGS to (search) LWE while the third reduction is from search-LWE to average case decisional LWE (DLWE ac ). There is a further reduction from DLWE ac to that of breaking the cryptosystem. We ignore this reduction, since this depends on the actual cryptosystem.
The second reduction, i.e., the one from DGS to LWE is the main contribution of [13] . A key step in this reduction consists of verifying solutions to LWE. This verification is done using a statistical test. It has been proved in [13] that asymptotically the success probability of the statistical test is exponentially close to one. The statistical test is used many times in the entire reduction and the success probability of the statistical test determines the overall success probability of the complete reduction. We take a close look at the success probability of the statistical test. Using the standard Hoeffding inequality, we determine an upper bound on the error of the statistical test. This in turn leads to a lower bound on the success probability of the test and then to a lower bound P S on the success probability of the entire reduction.
The success probability of the test depends on the value of the rejection threshold in the statistical test. The proof of Lemma 3.6 of [13] sets the rejection threshold t to be equal to 0.02. This value of t is sufficient to show that asymptotically the success probability goes to one for all values of the LWE error α ∈ (0, 1). For concrete security, however, t = 0.02 is sub-optimal. Using this value of t requires considering lattice dimensions as high as 400000 to ensure even somewhat meaningful tightness gap. In an alternative analysis, we consider the rejection threshold to be mid-way between the means of the two distributions under consideration. Using this value of the rejection threshold and considering α to be at most 1/ √ n we show that the success probability becomes close to one for reasonable value of n. Consequently, under this alternative analysis, the success probability of the statistical test has no effect on the overall tightness gap of the reduction.
The ring-LWE (RLWE) problem was later considered in [11] . This work showed a worst-case to average-case reduction which is analogous to the reduction in [13] . The reduction in [11] refers to the verification lemma used by Regev [13] . Regev's reduction has a quantum component. A follow up work by Peikert [12] showed how to remove the quantum component. This was achieved at the cost of using an exponential sized modulus. Though not explicitly mentioned, Peikert's work also requires the statistical test to verify LWE solutions. A later work by Brakerski et al. [7] , built upon Peikert's work to show classical hardness of LWE with polynomial sized modulus. Again, the verify LWE statistical test is implicitly used in this work. So, our concrete analysis of the success probability of the statistical test to verify LWE solutions should also apply to the reductions in [11, 12, 7] .
The importance of LWE in the context of lattice based cryptography is underscored by the fact that a number of submissions made to the ongoing NIST process for selecting a new public key standard base their security on the LWE problem and several of its variants. LWE based proposals which are in the second round of the NIST process are Frodo [2] , Kyber [3] , LAC [10] , NewHope [1] , Round5 [4] and Saber [9] . A recent work by Bernstein [5] performs a comparative study of the provable security of these and other lattice based proposals. While commenting on the tightness of reduction, Bernstein [5] comments that "the loss of tightness is gigantic" and credits [8] for pointing this out. For parameters of practical interest, our work slightly updates the tightness bound given in [8] .
Preliminaries
A full rank lattice L in R n is the set of all integer linear combinations of n linearly independent vectors v 1 , . . . , v n in R n . Following Regev [13] , L will also denote the n × n matrix whose columns are v 1 , . . . , v n . So, given a = (a 1 , . . . , a n ) ∈ Z n , La denotes the lattice point v = a 1 v 1 + · · · + a n v n and L −1 (v) denotes the integer coefficient vector a corresponding to v. The length of a vector is its Euclidean norm. For i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, λ i (L) is the least real number r such that L has i linearly independent vectors with the longest having length r. The dual of a lattice L is denoted as L * and is defined to be the set of all vectors y ∈ R n such that x, y ∈ Z for all x ∈ L.
The normal distribution with mean µ and standard deviation σ will be denoted as N (µ, σ). For α ∈ (0, 1), Ψ α is the probability distribution obtained by sampling from N (0, α/ √ 2π) and reducing the result modulo 1. Let p ≥ 2 be an integer. Let χ be a probability distribution on Z p . Let n be a positive integer and fix s ∈ Z n p . The distribution A s,χ on Z p n × Z p is defined as follows. Choose a uniformly at random from Z n p ; e from Z following χ and output (a, a, s + e). Let φ be a probability density function on T = (0, 1). The distribution A s,φ is defined as follows. Choose a uniformly at random from Z n p ; e from T following φ and output (a, a, s /p + e), where the addition is performed modulo 1.
Fix a positive integer n and an integer p ≥ 2. The learning with errors problem LWE p,χ is the following. For any s ∈ Z n p , given samples from A s,χ , it is required to output s. Similarly, for a probability density function φ on T, the LWE p,φ problem is the following. For any s ∈ Z n p , given samples from A s,φ , it is required to output s. For x ∈ R n and s > 0, define ρ s (x) = exp −π||x|| 2 /s 2 . For a lattice L, define ρ s (L) = x∈L ρ s (x). The discrete Gaussian distribution D L,s on a lattice L assigns to a vector v ∈ L the probability D L,s (v) = ρ s (v)/ρ s (L). Given a lattice L and a real number r, the discrete Gaussian sampling problem DGS L,r is to obtain a sample from D L,r .
For a lattice L and a real number > 0, the smoothing parameter η (L) is the smallest s such that ρ 1/s (L * \ {0}) ≤ .
From DGS to LWE
The following is a restatement of Theorem 3.1 of [13] which is the main result of [13] .
Theorem 1. Let L be a lattice of dimension n, p ≥ 2 be an integer and α ∈ (0, 1) be a real number. Given an oracle for LWE p,Ψα , it is possible to sample from
. . , 3n. The proof of the theorem is provided in [13] as a sequence of nested oracle calls. In the following, we rewrite the oracle calls and the other computations required for the proof in [13] in an algorithmic form. The required subroutines and data structures are as follows. The quantity c is a constant such that the LWE oracle is provided with n c samples. In the algorithm descriptions, we will make use of the following two subroutines mentioned below. We will not be needing the details of these procedures and so we do not describe these details. They can be found in [13] .
1. bootstrap(L, r): Here L is a lattice and r > √ 2n · η (L)/α. Returns a list L containing n c independent samples from D L,r 3n where r 3n = r · ((αp)/( √ n)) 3n .
reconstruct(x)
: This is used in solveCVP to reconstruct the closest vector by first applying a nearest neighbour algorithm and then retracing through the results returned by the repeated calls to solveCVP (p) .
Algorithm 1 Algorithm to solve DGS using an LWE oracle. return one element from L. 12: end function.
Concrete Analysis
The number of times the oracle solveLWE is called is determined by the following factors. for v in L do 5: a ← L −1 v mod p; for γ in Z do 10:
I ← {}; 11: for i ← 1 to n do 12: for (a, e) ∈ I do end for 22: end function.
1. The loop in solveDGS has 3n iterations. In the i-th iteration n c samples of D L,r i are used to generate n c samples of D L,r i−1 . Generating each sample of D L,r i−1 requires a call to quantumSample which in turn generates a call to solveCVP. So, the subroutines quantumSample and solveCVP are both called a total of 3n · n c = 3n c+1 times.
2. The loop in solveCVP has n iterations and in each iteration, a call to solveCVP (p) is made. So, each call to solveCVP generates n calls to solveCVP (p) .
3.
In solveCVP (p) , the set Z contains about n 2c values. So, the loop from Steps 9 to 21 makes about n 2c+1 calls to solveLWE and to verifyLWE. So, each call to solveCVP (p) generates n 2c+1 calls to solveLWE and to verifyLWE.
Algorithm 4 Algorithm to verify an LWE solution.
1: function verifyLWE(s , I )
2:
Let m ≤ n c be a positive integer;
3:
Choose m pairs (a 1 , x 1 ), . . . , (a m , x m ) from I ;
4:
w ← 0;
5:
for i ← 1 to m do 6:
w ← w + cos(2πy i ); 8: end for 9:
z ← w/m;
10:
Let t ∈ (0, 1); 11: if z > t then 12: return true Remark: Regev [13] has shown that each quantum computation is on a state of n log R qubits where R ≥ 2 3n λ n (L * ) is an integer. For c = 1 the number of quantum computations required is 3n 2 where each computation is on at least (3n 2 + n log λ n (L * )) bits. The cost of quantum computation increases quadratically with n.
The VerifyLWE algorithm is based on the proof of Lemma 3.6 of [13] . We highlight two aspects of VerifyLWE that are not present in this proof.
1. The parameter m is not present in the proof. The proof starts by considering n samples. This is achieved by setting m = n in VerifyLWE. Note that the set I has cardinality n c and so m can be at most n c .
2. The parameter t is not present in the proof. The proof considers the rejection threshold to be 0.02. This is achieved by setting t = 0.02 in VerifyLWE.
The choices of m = n and t = 0.02 are sufficient for asymptotic analysis. We show later that these choices are sub-optimal for concrete analysis. Algorithm verifyLWE is essentially a test of hypothesis. In verifyLWE, the pairs in I are of the form (a, a, s /p + e) where e follows Ψ β . The test statistic is the variable z. Let ξ 0 be the distribution of z when s = s and let µ 0 be the corresponding mean of z; let ξ 1 be the distribution of z when s = s and let µ 1 be the corresponding mean of z. The following have been proved by Regev [13] .
• ξ 0 = Ψ α so that µ 0 = exp(−πα 2 ) ≥ 0.04 for α < 1. Note that µ 0 > t = 0.02.
The computation performed by verifyLWE is a test of hypothesis between H 0 : s = s versus H 1 : s = s .
Two types of errors are to be considered. 
A Type-1 error will result in the correct value of s being rejected and so the entire reduction will not succeed. A Type-2 error will result in an incorrect value of s being accepted. This incorrect value of s will be passed on to verifyCVP (p) and then on to verifyCVP resulting in an incorrect solution to the CVP problem. So, again, the entire reduction will fail. So, it is required to ensure that both Type-1 and Type-2 errors are small. For i = 1, . . . , m, let v i = cos(2πy i ). Then v 1 , . . . , v m take values in the interval [−1, 1]. Applying the Hoeffding inequality (see Appendix A) to v 1 , . . . , v m and z = (v 1 + · · · + v m )/m, provides the following upper bounds on e 0 and e 1 .
If s = s, then the probability that verifyLWE makes an error is at most e 0 ; if s = s, then the probability that verifyLWE makes an error is at most e 1 . So, the probability that verifyLWE makes an error is at most max(e 0 , e 1 ) and so the probability that verifyLWE is successful is at least (1 − max(e 0 , e 1 )) = (1 − max(exp −m(µ 0 − t) 2 /2 , exp −mt 2 /2 )). Proposition 2 shows that verifyLWE is called a total of 3n 3c+3 times by solveDGS. The probability that all of these calls are successful is at least
Again from Proposition 2, the number of calls to solveLWE made by solveDGS is T = 3n 3c+3 and so the tightness gap of the reduction from DGS to LWE is at most
Numerical Results
To compute numerical values, we need to specify the values of the parameters m and t. We consider two scenarios. The first scenario corresponds to the values actually used in the proof of Lemma 3.6 of [13] . The second scenario corresponds to an alternative analysis where we change the value of the rejection threshold and consider values of α which occur in practice.
Concrete analysis of the proof Lemma 3.6 of [13] . As mentioned earlier, the proof of Lemma 3.6 of [13] corresponds to setting m = n and t = 0.02. Using m = n and t = 0.02, (6) simplifies to the following.
Setting c = 1 (which minimises the right hand side of (7)), we have evaluated T , P S and G for various values of n. It turns out that for n ≤ 350000, G is determined primarily by 1/P S while for n ≥ 400000, the value of 1/P S becomes negligible. For 2 ≤ n ≤ 350000, the value of G remains very high, for example for n = 350000, log 2 (log 2 (G)) ≈ 11.68. For n = 400000, log 2 (log 2 (G)) ≈ 6.83. The parameter n is the dimension of the underlying lattice. So, if the lattice dimension is to be chosen based on the proof of Lemma 3.6 of [13] , then the value of n has to be at least 400000.
Alternative concrete analysis. The statistical test performed by verifyLWE is essentially a test for the means µ 0 and µ 1 = 0 of the distributions ξ 0 and ξ 1 respectively. A natural value of the rejection threshold t is the choice µ 0 /2 = exp(−πα 2 )/2. This makes G depend on the value of α. A higher value of α makes the LWE problem more difficult but, also results in a worse tightness gap in the reduction from DGS to LWE. On the other hand, most practical cryptosystems 1 consider α to be at most 1/ √ n. To account for α ∈ (0, 1/ √ n), one may set t = exp(−π/n)/2. Using t = exp(−π/n)/2 gives the following expression for G.
As in the previous concrete analysis, setting c = 1 and m = n, we have computed the values of T , P S and G for various values of n. In this case, we observe that the value of P S becomes very close to 1 for values of n as small as 100. So, under this alternative concrete analysis, the value of G is determined entirely by T and is equal to 3n 6 for most practical values of n.
To summarise, the value of the rejection threshold t plays an important role in the concrete analysis. If the value of t is set to be equal to 0.02 as in the proof of Lemma 3.6 of [13] , then extremely high lattice dimensions are required for even somewhat meaningful tightness gap. On the other hand, choosing the rejection threshold to be mid-way between the means of the two distribution and considering α to be at most 1/ √ n, there is no noticeable effect of P S on the tightness gap for reasonable values of n. In this case, the tightness gap is given entirely by the number of oracle calls T .
Comparison to Previous Concrete Analysis
The complete reduction by Regev [13] is from worst case SIVP to average case decisional LWE problem (DLWE ac ). This reduction consists of three parts.
• SIVP to DGS with tightness gap 2n 3 [8] .
• DGS to LWE with tightness gap G given by (6) . In the previous concrete analysis [8] , the success probability of the statistical test was not considered and the value of T for the reduction from DGS to LWE was obtained as 3n c+3 . The reason for obtaining a lower value of T is that the loop over γ from Steps 9 to 21 in Algorithm solveCVP (p) was missed. So, the number of oracle calls to solveLWE for solving CVP (p) was considered to be n instead of n 2c+1 .
• LWE to DLWE ac with tightness gap np · n d 1 +2d 2 +2 [8] for positive integers d 1 and d 2 .
Our work does not change the tightness gaps of the first and the third reductions. The main part of the entire reduction is the second reduction. For this case, we have incorporated into the tightness gap the success probability of the statistical test required by the algorithm for verifying LWE solutions. This was not considered in [8] . The above concrete analysis shows that by appropriately setting the value of the rejection threshold and using values of α that are used in practice, there is no noticeable effect of the success probability on the tightness gap. Ignoring the effect of success probability, the only change of the concrete analysis with respect to [8] is in revising the number of oracle calls as mentioned above. In [8] , it was argued that for n = 1024, the tightness gap of the reduction from SIVP to DLWE ac is about 2 504 . Incorporating the revised number of oracle calls mentioned above, the tightness gap becomes 2 524 .
Conclusion
We have incorporated the success probability of the statistical test for verifying LWE solutions into an upper bound G on the tightness gap. If the rejection threshold is chosen as in the proof of Lemma 3.6 of [13] , then G is very high for values of n as large as 350000. On the other hand, we show that by choosing a different value of the rejection threshold and considering α to be at most 1/ √ n, there is no noticeable effect of the success probability on the value of G for reasonable values of n. Consequently, our work highlights the sensitivity of concrete security analysis to values of underlying parameters.
